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How to Unify
NICHOLAS K. JONES
University of Birmingham
This paper evaluates the argument for the contradictoriness of unity, that begins
Priest’s recent book One. The argument is seen to fail because it does not adequately
differentiate between different forms of unity. This diagnosis of the argument’s failure
is used as a basis for two consistent accounts of unity. The paper concludes by arguing
that reality contains two absolutely fundamental and unanalysable forms of unity,
which are in principle presupposed by any theory of anything. These fundamental
forms of unity are closely related to the unity of propositions and facts.
The emergence of unity from plurality is central to our conceptual scheme.Instances range from the familiar and mundane—for example, you are a
human being composed of many organs, the European Union is an institution
composed of many nation states, and the Broken Earth cycle is a work of fiction
composed of three novels—to the technical and recherché—for example, the set of
integers is a single individual composed of many numbers, and the proposition
that Tibbles purrs is a single individual composed of Tibbles and the property
of purring (or perhaps from representations thereof). The notion of composition
may not be exactly the same in each case; for unlike the set of integers, you
are not plausibly regarded as a value of the set-builder operation.1 Yet a single
phenomenon seems nonetheless present throughout: the emergence of one whole
from many parts, of unity from plurality.
Familiar as this phenomenon may be, Graham Priest’s provocative recent
book One begins by arguing that it is inherently contradictory.2 The core of the
argument runs as follows (8–9). If some things are unified, then that is because
something unifies them. Priest calls this unifying something their gluon. But
Contact: Nicholas K. Jones <n.k.jones@bham.ac.uk>
1. Fine (2010) and Hawley (2006) discuss the view that there are many different forms of
composition.
2. The argument comprises Chapter 1 of Priest (2014). All unadorned page references are
to this book.
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is this gluon a thing or not? On the one hand, it cannot be; for if the gluon is
a thing, then it cannot unify the original things—they and the gluon together
comprise just another plurality, not an individual. On the other hand it must
be; for (i) I’ve just referred to and thought about it, and (ii) if the gluon is not a
thing, then the original things are not unified because nothing unifies them. The
emergence of one from many thus gives rise to a dilemma, both horns of which
lead to contradiction.
I have two primary goals in this paper. One is to evaluate this argument for
the inconsistency of a central component of our conceptual scheme. The other
is to provide a positive, consistent account of how unity emerges from plurality.
In fact, I will provide two such accounts. Along the way, I hope to provide a
better understanding of what it is for relations to relate, the role of relations in
accounting for composite wholes, the variety of different kinds of unity, and of
what I will argue are reality’s two most fundamental forms of unity, namely the
unity of propositions and facts.
In more detail, I will argue that both horns of the dilemma fail. The argument
of the first horn is a version of Bradley’s regress, which I present in Section 1.3
I respond to this first horn in Section 2 by distinguishing two different notions
of unity. One is the compositional unity with which we began: the emergence of
one whole from many parts. The other is relationality: interrelatedness amongst
things. Priest’s Bradleyan regress argument shows that compositional unity
cannot explain compositional unity. Yet this is consistent with the plausible and
natural idea that relationality explains compositional unity, and is not itself a
form of compositional unity. This observation provides the basis for my first
account of unity. I respond to the second horn of the dilemma in Section 3 by
presenting my second account of unity, which generalises the first so as to avoid
invoking any such things as relations or gluons. This shows how, whether gluons
are things or not, they can consistently explain how one emerges from many.
Section 4 then discusses a revenge problem for my second proposal. I respond
by differentiating compositional unity from a form of unity closely related to the
unity of propositions, which I argue is one of reality’s most fundamental forms of
unity and cannot in principle be explained in other terms. The paper closes by
identifying a second fundamental form of unity with this feature, which is closely
related to the unity of facts.
1. The Argument
Here’s how Priest argues that gluons cannot unify, if they are things:4
3. See Bradley (1897: Chapters 2 and 3) for Bradley’s original version of the regress, and
Perovic (2017) for a helpful overview.
4. Priest uses ‘object’ where I use ‘thing’.
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Suppose that we have a unity comprising the parts a, b, c, d, for example.
There must be something which, metaphysically speaking, binds them
together. This is the object’s gluon, g. But then there must be something
which binds g and a, b, c, d together, a hyper-gluon, g′. There must, then,
be something which binds g′, g, and a, b, c, d together, a hyper-hyper-gluon,
g′′. Obviously we are off on an infinite regress. Moreover, it is a vicious
one.
Perhaps it is not immediately obvious that this is so. Could there not
just be a whole lot’a gluin’ goin’ on? To understand why this is not a
valid response, we must come back to what is at issue here. Our original
problem was how a unity of parts is possible. We need an explanation.
Given a bunch of parts, simply invoking another object does not do this.
We still have the original problem of how a unity of parts is possible. . . .
In vicious regresses of this kind . . . the infinity has, in fact, precious little
to do with matters. The point is that something has already gone wrong
at the first step: a failure of explanation. (11)
Although the assumption that gluons are things plays no explicit role in this
passage, Priest’s idea is that merely postulating and quantifying over gluons
involves treating them as things: “we can refer to it [i.e., a postulated gluon],
quantify over it, talk about it. If this does not make something an object [i.e., a
thing], I am at a loss to know what could” (15, original emphasis). I return to
this connection between quantification and thinghood in Section 3. Until then,
it is fine for present purposes to treat Priest as arguing here that an adequate
account of unity is impossible because an adequate account of how gluons unify
is impossible.
It will be useful to regiment Priest’s argument slightly. As a first attempt, we
might see it as employing the following principles:5
Unity 1a For any x1, . . . , xn (x1, . . . , xn are unified→ some y unifies x1, . . . , xn)
Unity 2a For any x1, . . . , xn, y(y unifies x1, . . . , xn→ y, x1, . . . , xn are unified)
We can then represent Priest as arguing as follows. Consider any a, b, c, d that
compose something, that is, that are unified in the sense that concerns Priest. So
(a1) is true:
(a1) a, b, c, d are unified.
(a2) So by Unity 1a: (for some g) g unifies a, b, c, d.
(a3) So by Unity 2a: g, a, b, c, d are unified.
5. ‘→’ is the material conditional. ‘n’ can be any natural number.
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(a4) So by Unity 1a: (for some g′) g′ unifies g, a, b, c, d.
(a5) So by Unity 2a: g′, g, a, b, c, d are unified.
...
On this reconstruction, the argument is valid and the regress is genuine but not
vicious.6
The argument shows that if Unity 1a and 2a are true, then whenever some
things compose a unity there is an infinite series of facts of the forms (i) x1, . . . , xn
are unified, and (ii) y unifies x1, . . . , xn. That infinite series is no more problematic
than this other infinite series of facts that follow from it being the case that p: p,
it’s true that p, it’s true that it’s true that p, it’s true that it’s true that it’s true that
p, . . .. Setting qualms about infinity aside, there is no obvious reason to regard
the mere existence of either series as problematic.
Unlike the quoted passage, this reconstruction makes no mention of explana-
tion. Yet Priest’s goal is an account of “how, if an object has parts, these cooperate
to produce a unity—one thing” (5) and “how a unity of parts is possible” (11). This
requires an explanation of how unity emerges from plurality that does not itself
involve unity.7 We obtain a better reconstruction of Priest’s argument by making
the explanatory connections explicit. To do so, I use ‘because’ as a two-place
sentential connective that expresses the relevant notion of explanation.
Our second reconstruction presents the argument as employing these two
principles:8
6. This reconstruction does not capture Priest’s intention. I discuss it here in order to
illustrate the importance of explanatory concerns in obtaining a good argument.
7. Is this explanation in some familiar sense, or the more rarefied form of metaphysical
explanation popular in the recent literature about ground? I don’t know. But I don’t think
that it’s relevant for present purposes. What matters is that the explanation’s goal be to render
unity intelligible in unity-free terms.
8. I differentiate the principles and so present each stage of the regress as decomposing
into two sub-stages, one for an application of each principle. Note, however, that Priest does
not explicitly distinguish these steps in the quoted passage. An alternative reconstruction that
perhaps stays closer to Priest’s presentation would employ the following in place of Unity 2b:
For any x1, . . . , xn , y
(
y unifies x1, . . . , xn → for some z(y unifies x1, . . . , xn because z
unifies y, x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
The argument would then proceed beyond (b2) solely by applications of this new principle,
without invoking Unity 1b again: g unifies a, b, c, d because g′ unifies g, a, b, c, d, because
g′′ unifies g′ , g, a, b, c, d,. . .. Notice that the new principle follows from Unity 1b and 2b by
transitivity and factivity of ‘because’. Thus nothing of substance that follows seems to turn on
the difference between the version of the argument in the text and this alternative one. It is
clear, however, that this alternative regress concerns not the notion of unity itself or of things
being unified, but of one thing unifying some others. Since these are different notions—one is
monadic, the other relational, for a start—this alternative argument reveals nothing distinctive
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Unity 1b For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are unified → for some y(x1, . . . , xn
are unified because y unifies x1, . . . , xn)
)
Unity 2b For any x1, . . . , xn, y
(
y unifies x1, . . . , xn → y unifies x1, . . . , xn
because y, x1, . . . , xn are unified
)
Unity 1b says that when things are unified, that’s because a particular thing unifies
them. And Unity 2b says that when one thing unifies others, that’s because it and
they are unified. We can now represent Priest as arguing thus, concerning any
a, b, c, d that compose something:9
(b1) a, b, c, d are unified.
(b2) So by Unity 1b: (for some g) a, b, c, d are unified because g unifies a, b, c, d.
(b3) So by Unity 2b: g unifies a, b, c, d because g, a, b, c, d are unified.
(b4) So by Unity 1b: (for some g′) g, a, b, c, d are unified because g′ unifies
g, a, b, c, d.
(b5) So by Unity 2b: g′ unifies g, a, b, c, d because g′, g, a, b, c, d are unified.
...
On this reconstruction, the argument is valid and delivers an explanatory regress:
a, b, c, d are unified
g unifies a, b, c, d g, a, b, c, d are unified
g′ unifies g, a, b, c, d g′, g, a, b, c, d are unified
...
because
because
because
because
because
This regress is vicious, given Priest’s goal: an account of how unity is possible. We
began with an instance of unity at (b1). That was explained by another instance
about unification itself: this regress concerns unifiers, not unification in the sense of composing
a whole. Since the argument in the text invokes unification—i.e., composition of a whole—after
‘because’ at every other stage, it is a better candidate for revealing something distinctive about
that, as Priest seems to take it to do.
9. The validity of the argument beyond b2 requires the factivity of ‘because’: ((p because
q)→ (p ∧ q)).
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of unity at (b3) (via b2). And that was explained by another instance of unity at
(b5) (via b4). And so on ad infinitum. Because each instance of unity is explained
by another instance of unity, unity itself goes unexplained. As an account of
unity itself—the general phenomenon as opposed to particular instances—this
approach therefore fails.10
Priest concludes that an adequate account of unity is impossible (if glu-
ons/unifiers are objects). That conclusion follows only if no alternative account is
available. The next section argues that by distinguishing between different kinds
of unity, we can attain an adequate account of Priest’s target kind of unity.
2. Two Kinds of Unity
Our first kind of unity is compositionality. This kind of unity is involved when a
plurality compose a single individual, as in the examples with which we began.
It is also Priest’s target notion of unity, as his discussion throughout Chapter
1 makes clear. Two pieces of terminology will be helpful below. The first is
monadic:11 x1, . . . , xn are compositionally unified iff they compose something. The
second is polyadic: y compositionally unifies x1, . . . , xn iff x1, . . . , xn compose y.12
Our second kind of unity is relationality. This kind of unity is involved when
a plurality are related to one another. Like compositional unity, examples range
from the mundane to the highly theoretical; for example, Tibbles is on the mat,
i is greater than −i, and a grounds b. Again, two pieces of terminology will be
helpful. The first is monadic: x1, . . . , xn are relationally unified iff they are related
to one another. The second is polyadic: relation y relationally unifies x1, . . . , xn
10. One might be tempted to conclude that the attempted explanation of unification failed
because it started in the wrong place; to explain unification in general, we need to start
by explaining not some particular instance of unification, as in (b1), but why there are any
unified things at all. Tempting as this idea may be, I think it cannot be quite right. One
way to explain why there are any Fs at all is to pick some particular instances of F and then
explain in completely F-free terms, and without presupposing any F-facts whatsoever, why
they are F. As I will argue in Section 2 and Section 3, this can be done for unification, by
rejecting certain versions of Unity 1b and 2b and replacing them with others. The problem
with Unity 1b and 2b is not that they explain only particular instances of unification. The
problem is that they jointly preclude explanation of unification in unification-free terms without
presupposing any unification-facts: since Unity 1b uses unifiers to explain unification, and
Unity 2b uses unification to explain unifiers, Unity 1b’s explanation of unification is not
ultimately unification-free.
11. Monadic in the sense of having one (plural) argument position, not in the sense of
applying only to single individuals.
12. The precise adicity of ‘compositionally unifies’ depends on how we treat ‘x1, . . . , xn’. If
it is a single (ordered) plural term, then ‘compositionally unifies’ is dyadic. If it is a sequence
of singular terms, ‘compositionally unifies’ is variably polyadic. Nothing turns on this issue
here. Likewise mutatis mutandis for ‘relationally unifies’ below.
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iff y is a relation that holds amongst x1, . . . , xn (in that order).13 So, for example,
Tibbles and the mat are relationally unified because Tibbles is on the mat, and the
relation of being on relationally unifies Tibbles and the mat because it holds from
the former to the latter.14
These two kinds of unity are distinct: relationality is not a form of compo-
sitionality. This makes relationality available for non-regressive explanation of
compositionality in other terms, as we will see below. To see why relationality is
not a form of compositionality, note that when Tibbles is on the mat, it doesn’t
follow that there’s a further thing—for example, a fact or state of affairs in the
mould of Armstrong (1996)—composed of Tibbles and the mat (or even of Tibbles,
the mat, and being on). One could of course postulate such a thing within one’s
substantive metaphysical theory of relationality. But its existence is not built into
the notion of relationality itself: relationality does not, in and of itself, involve
the emergence of one from many. As we will see towards the end of this section,
Priest himself acknowledges this fact.
With this distinction to hand, let us return to Priest’s argument. The argument
is supposed to show that no adequate explanation of unity is possible. We now
need to be clear about which forms of unity are at work in its three premises:
(b1), Unity 1b, and Unity 2b. Different versions of those premises are obtained by
replacing the generic notion of unity with our two specific kinds of unity, that is,
compositionality and relationality. We can block the argument by showing that
some plausible distribution of truth-values across those principles (a) does not
give rise to problematic regress, and (b) suffices to explain Priest’s target notion
of unity. And that is what I will do. To aid readability, I often use ‘c-unified’
and ‘r-unified’ (and their cognates) to abbreviate ‘compositionally unified’ and
‘relationally unified’ (and their cognates).
Let us begin with the first premise (a1)/(b1). The goal is to explain how one
emerges from many, that is, compositionality. So the first premise must concern
c-unification:
(1) a, b, c, d are c-unified.
13. Note that nominalism about relations is compatible with relational unification but not
with relational unifiers. That’s because relational unifiers are relations, which nominalists reject.
But nominalists don’t deny that things can be related to one another, as when Tibbles is on the
mat, for example. Nominalists only deny that when things are related, a relation holds between
them. I return to nominalism and realism about relations in Section 3.
14. Following Lewis (1983), we can distinguish between sparse and abundant notions of
relational unification and unifiers. Sparse conceptions restrict the definitions in the text to
highly natural or fundamental relations. For example, electron pairs with opposite spin are
arguably sparsely relationally unified, and the highly natural relation of opposite spin sparsely
unifies them. On abundant conceptions, by contrast, any way of being related suffices, however
unnatural and gerrymandered. I’ll work with sparse notions for simplicity, and aim to explicitly
highlight where the distinction matters.
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This follows from the supposition that a, b, c, d compose something.
(1) concerns c-unification. So a valid argument and explanation of c-unification
requires a version of Unity 1 whose antecedent also concerns c-unification. But
what about its consequent? There are two versions, one for c-unification and one
for r-unification:15
Unity 1cc For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified→ for some y(x1, . . . , xn
are c-unified because y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn)
)
Unity 1cr For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified→ for some y(x1, . . . , xn
are c-unified because y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn)
)
Both principles explain a certain monadic feature of pluralities—a property pos-
sessed by all and only pluralities that compose something—in terms of how
they’re related to a particular entity. According to Unity 1cc, they compose it.
According to Unity 1cr, it is a relation that holds amongst them. I examine these
ideas in turn.
Begin with Unity 1cc. It validates the argument from (1) to (2cc):16
(2cc) a, b, c, d are c-unified because g c-unifies a, b, c, d.
This uses c-unifiers to explain c-unification. This explanation remains within the
compositional. So a further principle is required to explain c-unifiers. We need
a version of Unity 2 whose antecedent concerns c-unifiers, of which there are
two:17
Unity 2cc For any x1, . . . , xn, y
(
y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn→ y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn
because y, x1, . . . , xn are c-unified
)
Unity 2cr For any x1, . . . , xn, y
(
y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn→ y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn
because y, x1, . . . , xn are r-unified
)
Unity 2cc delivers a vicious regress: c-unification is explained by a c-unifier
(by Unity 1cc), which is explained by c-unification (by Unity 2cc), which is
15. A note on labelling. We will see a range of variations on Unity 1 and 2. Each connects
one kind of unity to another that explains it. I have tried to label the principles in a way that
makes this visible. Label endings are of the form ‘xy’, to indicate that x-unity is explained in
terms of y-unity. Thus Unity 1cc explains c-unity in terms of c-unity, and Unity 1cr explains
c-unity in terms of r-unity.
16. Strictly, Unity 1cc entails a version of (2cc) in which ‘g’ is replaced by a variable bound
by an initial existential quantifier. The principle in the text follows from letting ‘g’ name an
arbitrary witness to this generalisation. Likewise mutatis mutandis for (2cr) below.
17. An alternative option is: for any x1, . . . , xn , y
(
y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn → y c-unifies
x1, . . . , xn because y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn
)
. This says that the composed thing is always a re-
lation whose holding amongst the parts explains why they compose it. I think we can safely set
such explanatory circularity aside.
Ergo · vol. 5, no. 31 · 2018
824 · Nicholas K. Jones
explained by a c-unifier (by Unity 1cc), which . . .. The explanation never leaves
the compositional, hence fails to explain how compositionality is possible. So let
us consider Unity 2cr instead.
Given (2cc), Unity 2cr entails:
(3cr) g c-unifies a, b, c, d because g, a, b, c, d are r-unified.
Given the materials thus far, no regress follows. However, I see two problems
with the resulting view.
Firstly, it is implausible that whenever some things compose another, they
do so merely because they are related to it somehow or other. That is too
undiscriminating a notion. Given an abundant conception of relations (Footnote
14), every plurality are related to every individual in many different ways, but no
plurality compose every individual. This suggests that x1, . . . , xn being abundantly
related to y is too uninformative to really explain them composing y. Perhaps a
sparse conception of relations will avoid this problem, though it’s not entirely
clear. For all I know, the following may be possible: (i) some plurality are sparsely
related to something they compose, and (ii) some plurality are sparsely related
to something they don’t compose. If so, then this suggests that even x1, . . . , xn
being sparsely related to y is still too uninformative to explain them composing y.
The view seems to need modifying so that what explains x1, . . . , xn composing y
is some particular way in which x1, . . . , xn are sparsely related to y, rather than
just their being sparsely related somehow or other.18
Secondly, the view has potentially unattractive commitments.19 On this view,
a plurality composes something because they compose a certain particular thing.
And they compose that thing because of how they’re (non-compositionally) related
to it. So, for example, Tibbles’s organs compose something because they compose
Tibbles, because of how they’re (non-compositionally) related to Tibbles. The
18. This is naturally implemented by replacing Unity 2cr with either of:
For any x1, . . . , xn , y
(
y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn → for some z(y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn because z
r-unifies y, x1, . . . , xn)
)
For any x1, . . . , xn , y
(
y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn → ∃Zn+1(y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn because
Zn+1(x1, . . . , xn , y))
)
The second problem in the main text afflicts these modified principles too. I discuss the
second-order quantifier used in the second principle in Section 3, where I also propose a nearby
alternative (Unity c) that avoids the problems in the main text.
19. My own view is that these commitments are unattractive only for cases of what
Fine (2010: 582) calls generative applications of compositional operations, i.e., when parts are
metaphysically prior to whole. There is an attractive neo-Aristotelian tradition according to
which the compositional operations connecting ordinary macroscopic substances, including
ourselves, with their matter, are not of that kind. See, e.g., Wiggins (2001) or Jones (2015) for
more.
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explanatory base thus includes both Tibbles and his organs. This places parts
and whole on an even metaphysical footing, with both involved in explaining
what composes what. There is no deep metaphysical sense in which the parts are
prior to the whole on this view, or in which the unified whole emerges from the
plurality of parts. The composition relation is explained, but not the existence of
composed wholes. Many will find this implausible. And it does not explain how
unities themselves are possible. So let us set this view aside.
We’ve just seen that Unity 1cc does not deliver an adequate explanation of
c-unification, whether combined with Unity 2cc or Unity 2cr. So let us reject all
three principles and consider Unity 1cr instead. That and (1) entail:
(2cr) a, b, c, d are c-unified because g r-unifies a, b, c, d.
We now have an explanation of c-unification in non-compositional terms: things
compose (if they do) because a relation holds amongst them. The emergence of
one from many is explained by relations holding amongst the many: relationality
explains compositionality.
Does problematic regress arise? Not easily. The original regress was problem-
atic because each instance of the target kind of unification (i.e., c-unification) was
always eventually explained via another instance of that same kind of unification.
To achieve that from Unity 1cr would require something to force an explanation of
r-unification in terms of c-unification or c-unifiers. Either of the following would
suffice:
Unity 2rc For any x1, . . . , xn, y
(
y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn → y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn
because y, x1, . . . , xn are c-unified
)
Unity 3 For any x1, . . . , xn, y
(
y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn → y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn
because y c-unifies x1, . . . , xn
)
We are, however, free to reject both principles, and to combine that with acceptance
of Unity 1cr.20
Another way to obtain regress would be to explain relationality via relational-
ity, as in:21
Unity 1rr For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are r-unified→ for some y(x1, . . . , xn
are r-unified because y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn)
)
20. An instance of Unity 2rc might be David Armstrong’s (1996) theory of states of affairs or
Jason Turner’s (2016) factalism. On these views (roughly), objects and properties are derivative
abstractions from states of affairs that combine them, and objects possess properties in virtue
of their composing states of affairs with those properties. Unity 3 says that relations that hold
amongst things are, and do so because they are, composed by those things. I do not know of
any extant instances of this strange view.
21. I discuss the regress arising from Unity 1rr further in Section 3.
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Unity 2rr For any x1, . . . , xn, y
(
y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn → y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn
because y, x1, . . . , xn are r-unified
)
Notice that Unity 2rr generates regress only in conjunction with Untiy 1rr, whereas
Unity 1rr itself suffices for regress. Unity 1rr suffices for regress because y holding
amongst x1, . . . , xn is one way of y, x1, . . . , xn being related to one another, that
is, being r-unified. This instance of r-unification can then be plugged back into
the antecedent of Unity 1rr to yield another r-unifier and hence instance of
r-unification. And so on ad infinitum.22
Unity 1rr captures the core of the Bradleyan regress of relations. Four points
follow about this regress.
Firstly, even Priest employs relationality in his dialetheic account of unity. On
his view, gluons unify by being identical to each of the things they unify. So, for
example, gluon g unifies a, b, c, d because:
g = a ∧ g = b ∧ g = c ∧ g = d
The identity relation is clearly essential to this account.23
Secondly, this regress concerns relationality, not compositionality. Any prob-
lems that arise primarily concern relationality, not compositionality. Although
such problems do concern compositionality indirectly—if compositionality is
explained via relationality, as in Unity 1cr—they are not distinctive of compo-
sitionality. Any other phenomenon explained in relational terms is similarly
afflicted. If Priest’s argument that gluons cannot unify depends on this regress,
it is equally an argument for the inadequacy of any relational explanation of
anything and reveals nothing distinctive about compositionality.
22. One could block this regress by adopting a sparse conception of r-unification (see
Footnote 14) and denying that y holding amongst x1, . . . , xn involves y, x1, . . . , xn being sparsely
related to one another. Although this is an option, advocates of Unity 1rr should resist it. It
entails that the key theoretical primitive of the theory of relations, namely ‘holds amongst’,
the relational analogue of ‘instantiates’, expresses an unnatural and gerrymandered notion.
But according to Unity 1rr, relations do genuine explanatory work within metaphysics: when
things are sparsely related, it’s because a relation holds amongst them. Highly natural notions,
like being sparsely related, shouldn’t be explained in terms of much less natural ones. So the
regress should not be blocked in this way. For discussion of the role of ‘holds amongst’ in
supplying the theory of relations with content, see Jones (2017: Sections 2–3).
23. Perhaps Priest could respond by denying that identity is a relation, on the grounds
that it never holds between distinct things. I see three difficulties with this suggestion. (i)
Relations with reflexive instances are presumably unproblematic, e.g., being the same height
as. But then it is unclear why the limiting case of relations like identity with only reflexive
instances should be thought problematic. (ii) Identity is the negation of distinctness, a relation
which unproblematically holds between (all and only) distinct things. Assuming that the
negation of a relation is a relation, identity is a relation too. (iii) Even if identity isn’t a relation,
Priest’s proposal still makes essential use of the conjunction relation expressed by ‘∧’, on which
see Footnote 26.
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Thirdly, the regress shows that one cannot explain how relationality is possible
by invoking relations. Although each instance of relationality is explained given
Unity 1rr, it’s explained by another instance of relationality having the form: r
holds amongst x1, . . . , xn.24 Relationality itself therefore goes unexplained. Is this
problematic? It depends on our explanatory goals. If our goal is just to explain
how compositionality is possible, however, then it is unproblematic. As was
argued above, relationality and compositionality are distinct phenomena. So we
may legitimately use relationality to explain compositionality, even if we cannot
explain in other terms how relationality itself is possible. Every explanation must
treat something as primitive; provided it’s not what one seeks to explain, this is
no threat to explanatory adequacy. One form of unity may thus be used to explain
how a very different one is possible, as in Unity 1cr.
Fourthly, it appears to be impossible in principle to explain how relationality
itself is possible. So Unity 1cr cannot be faulted for using unexplained relationality
to explain compositionality. The impossibility arises because an explanation
of how relationality is possible is extremely close to an explanation of how
predication is possible. But an explanation of how predication is possible requires
an account of predication couched in predication-free terms, which is known
to be impossible; I return to this at the end of Section 4. The only way to
explain relationality without explaining all predication is to somehow explain
relationality in purely monadic terms. Yet it is doubtful whether this is possible,
for the following reason.
It is hard to see how any such account could avoid using two-place sentential
connectives like ‘and’ to connect monadic predications of different relata. For
example, suppose one wants to use the distribution of monadic heights across
individuals to explain the is taller than relation. What accounts for a being taller
than b, isn’t merely that a is six feet tall, say; and it isn’t merely that b is five feet
tall, say. For each of those monadic height-predications is individually compatible
with a not being taller than b. Rather, what accounts for a being taller than b is
this: a is six feet tall and b is five feet tall.25 Some sentential connective is needed
24. One could try to use relationality to explain how relationality is possible by restricting
Unity 1rr to exclude ‘holds amongst’ predications. Two points in response. (i) Although this
blocks the regress, it leaves the relationality of holding amongst unexplained. The proposal
therefore does not explain how relationality itself is possible, but merely uses one kind of
relationality alongside a plenitude of relations to explain all others. (ii) The approach embodies
an unattractive double standard. It treats the key theoretical primitive of the theory of relations—
i.e., the ‘holds amongst’ relational predicate—differently from all other relational predicates
used for serious theoretical work. It is hard to see what could motivate using relations to
explain some theoretically important cases of relationality, but not those concerning what holds
amongst what.
25. This argument generalises to any relation R that lacks a base of monadic properties
F1, F2, . . . such that (i) for each Fi , at least one of Fi(x) and Fi(y) necessitates R(x, y), and (ii)
R(x, y) necessitates the disjunction whose disjuncts are (Fi(x) ∨ Fi(y)) for all the Fi . Most
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here to link a monadic predication of one relatum with a monadic predication of
the other relatum, in order to obtain a distribution of monadic properties across
both relata. Yet sentential connectives express relations on the semantic values
of sentences.26 Any supposedly monadic account of relationality will therefore
employ relationality after all, in the guise of logical relations like conjunction. If
so, then it is impossible to explain relationality in purely monadic terms, and
hence impossible to explain relationality in purely non-relational terms too.27 We
ought therefore to reject Unity 1rr, and the project of explaining how relationality
is possible along with it.28 Unity 1cr then provides a non-regressive explanation
of how compositionality is possible.
On this combination of views, composition is always explained by relations
holding amongst things (by Unity 1cr), though relational truths and facts are not
always explained in that way (since we reject Unity 1rr). This suggests that we
could cut out the intermediary relations, and use relational facts (as opposed to
relations holding amongst things) to explain composition directly instead, thereby
avoiding any lingering concerns about Unity 1rr. The next section develops this
kind of view.
The lesson, I think, is as follows. Priest presents his argument as a version
interesting relations appear to be like that. But if (i) and (ii) are satisfied, each instance R(x, y)
is necessitated by a monadic predication Fi(x) or Fi(y), at least opening the possibility of
reducing R to such predications.
26. One could respond by denying that the connectives express relations or have worldly
correlates of any kind; they belong instead to our primitive theoretical ideology. This is too big
an issue to address properly here. I will merely sketch why I am not attracted to this approach,
without pretending to settle the matter. Firstly, non-denotational treatments of the connectives
make it difficult to formulate a generalised semantic theory—I believe this terminology is due
to Linnebo and Rayo (2012: 275)—in which one can generalise about all the different meanings
any expression could in principle have had, including the connectives. By contrast, denotational
treatments of the connectives extend smoothly into generalised semantic theories by enabling
generalisation over the denotations of the connectives. But these connective-denotations are
presumably relations, or something very much like them. Secondly, I am attracted to systems of
higher-order logic that permit quantifiers to bind variables of all semantic types, including that
of the connectives. A suitable notion of identity and the validity of existential generalisation
will then deliver theorems like ‘∃X(X = ∧)’, where ‘X’ is a variable of the same type as
binary sentential connectives, and ‘=’ is an identity predicate taking binary connectives in
both argument positions. We can think of that formula as saying that there (higher-order) is
a conjunction relation. I return to higher-order quantification and identity in Section 3 and
Section 4. On higher-order identity, see also Dorr (2016).
27. MacBride (2016) discusses several other problems for monadic analyses of relationality.
28. This does not entail that we should reject the existence of relations. One may believe that
relations exist because one takes them to do theoretical work that does not require Unity 1rr’s
truth. For example, relations allow us to formulate first-order generalisations encoding patterns
of relational commonality that would otherwise require higher-order quantification, and to
provide referents for predicate-nominalisations like ‘wisdom’. See Section 3 and Footnote 32
for more.
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of Bradley’s regress. Bradley’s goal was to show that relationality is incoherent,
and his regress argument specifically concerns relationality, not compositionality.
Although the Bradleyan regress does not show that relationality is incoherent,29 it
does show that one cannot explain relationality itself by invoking relations; for
relational ‘holds amongst’-predications are required by any such account. The
underlying mistake driving Priest’s argument is to assimilate compositionality
too closely to relationality, and to treat the Bradleyan argument’s conclusion as
concerning compositionality as a result. Once these notions are distinguished,
however, Bradleyan regress is no obstacle to an adequate relational account of
compositionality.
Priest presents two objections to views that appeal to relations. Here’s the
first:
There is already a confusion at the heart of this thought . . . between
relating and unifying. Relations do not, in general, unify. I am related to
my mother by bearing the relationship of child to her. . . . But obviously
the relation does not serve to render my mother and myself a unity in the
appropriate sense. (12)
However, Unity 1cr does not entail that relations always c-unify. It says that each
case of compositionality is explained by some case of relationality, not that each
case of relationality explains some case of compositionality. The proposal requires
a distinction between relations whose relating c-unifies their relata, and those
whose relating does not. But I see no obvious reason to regard that as problematic.
Problems will arise if this distinction can only be explained in compositional
terms, as, for example, the distinction between the relations whose holding
explains composition and those whose holding does not. I cannot settle here
whether that is so. But other options are available. Perhaps the distinction is
utterly simple and fundamental. Or perhaps the unifying relations are those
whose holding suffices for a life in Peter van Inwagen’s (1990) sense, or for
consciousness à la Trenton Merricks (2003). The framework of Kit Fine’s (2010)
provides an alternative model, on which the distinction will depend on the kind
of whole and mode of composition at issue. It will be difficult to articulate the
distinction precisely for non-toy examples of actual wholes. But that is a difficulty
of practice not principle, and is just what we should expect of our messy and
complex world.
Here’s Priest’s second objection to invoking relations:
29. Given that the Bradleyan regress arises primarily from Unity 1rr, it shows that rela-
tionality is incoherent only if both (i) the coherence of relationality requires the truth of Unity
1rr, and (ii) the explanatory regress arising from Unity 1rr shows that it is false. Whatever
one thinks about (ii), one should reject (i). Nominalists about relations reject (i), as may those
whose reasons for believing in relations do not require Unity 1rr (see Footnote 28). Perhaps
those views are false, but they’re certainly not incoherent.
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When one invokes the [relation] in question, one simply adds an extra
element to the melange. If one is puzzled by unity in the first case, one
should be equally puzzled by the supposed unity in the second. . . . We
have the parts plus the relationship between them. . . . How is this any
better? (12–13)
However, when relations occur in Unity 1cr, it is not merely as an “element of the
melange”. The explanation of c-unification does not merely exhibit a relation
alongside the parts but says, of relation and parts, how they are: the relation
holds amongst the parts. From a logico-semantic perspective, the explanation is
expressed not by a singular term for the relation alone, or even by a plural term
for relation and parts. The explanation is expressed by a whole sentence which
says, of the relation and parts, how they are configured. Following David Lewis
(1992: 206–207), we should distinguish two fundamentally different matters: what
there is and how things are. The latter does not reduce to the former.30 In the quote
above, Priest seems to assume that an appeal to relations is an appeal merely to
what there is, whereas Unity 1cr’s appeal to relations is an appeal to how things
are. This explanation does not merely exhibit a unifying individual, but says how
it stands to other individuals. So puzzlement about compositionality need not,
and should not, extend to the relationality that explains it. In short, gluons glue
and thereby give rise to (c-)unity by being relations that hold amongst the parts
of composed wholes.
3. How to Unify Without Things that are Gluons
We’ve seen how gluons can unify, even if they are things. That suffices to show
that compositionality is not inherently contradictory. The second horn of Priest’s
dilemma maintains that unity cannot arise if gluons are not things—that is, if
there are no such things as gluons—because then nothing unifies the parts of
30. Note that these matters are not independent. For example, if a relation holds amongst
things (how things are), then there is that relation (what there is). How things are does
not reduce to what there is because the latter underdetermines the former: the relation’s
existence underdetermines what it holds amongst. For an attempt to overcome this obstacle,
see Armstrong’s (1989) and (1996) theory of truthmakers and states of affairs. Armstrong joins
typical theories of relations in accepting: when R(a, b), there is a relation R and individuals
a and b, whose joint existence is (typically) compatible with ¬R(a, b), and such that R holds
amongst a and b (which necessitates R(a, b)). Armstrong goes beyond typical theories of
relations in also accepting: when R(a, b), there is an individual that somehow combines R
with a and b, and whose mere existence is incompatible with ¬R(a, b). Armstrong calls these
individuals states of affairs. He attempts to reduce how things are to what there is by using
the existence of states of affairs to account for all of how things are. Note, however, that the
existence of states of affairs, and hence the availability of this reduction, is not entailed by
realism about relations. See Lewis (1992) for criticism of Armstrong’s approach.
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unities. I now generalise the previous section’s proposal to show that this is not
so.
Central to my proposal is:
Unity 1cr For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified→ for some y(x1, . . . , xn
are c-unified because y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn)
)
The consequent existentially quantifies over r-unifiers. To r-unify some things
is to be a relation that holds amongst them. So the proposal requires realism
about relations, the thesis that there are such things as relations. The proposal is
therefore incompatible with nominalism about relations, the thesis that there are
no such things as relations. I will now show how the proposal can be reconstrued
in nominalistically acceptable terms, to yield an account of unity without relations
(a.k.a. gluons).
Consider ordinary cases of relationality first, not those involved in c-unification.
Realists accept claims like:
Being on holds amongst Tibbles and the mat (in that order).
Being between holds amongst Birmingham, Oxford, and Sheffield (in that
order).
Because those claims mention relations, nominalists reject them in favour of claims
like:
Tibbles is on the mat.
Birmingham is between Oxford and Sheffield.
Where realists have a property-name and variably polyadic ‘holds amongst’ pred-
icate, nominalists have only familiar relational predications. Now, consider the
particular explanations of c-unification provided by Unity 1cr. Those are claims
like:31
a1, . . . , an compose something because being arranged cat-wise holds amongst
a1, . . . , an.
b1, . . . , bn compose something because being arranged table-wise holds amongst
b1, . . . , bn.
Nominalists can achieve the same explanatory effect without mentioning relations
by instead employing claims like:
a1, . . . , an compose something because a1, . . . , an are arranged cat-wise.
31. For simplicity, I elide the distinction between relations and plural properties, and ignore
order.
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b1, . . . , bn compose something because b1, . . . , bn are arranged table-wise.
The explanatory power of each instance of Unity 1cr can thereby be achieved
without mention of relations or use of the ‘holds amongst’ predicate characteristic
of realism. One can thus use relationality to explain each instance of composition-
ality via nominalistically acceptable means, and without invoking such things as
relations (a.k.a. gluons). The result is a nominalistically acceptable alternative to
each specific explanation of c-unification provided by Unity 1cr.
However, we do not yet have a nominalistically acceptable alternative to Unity
1cr itself. Systematic theory, as opposed to a mere collection of theses, requires a
single generalisation from which these specific explanations follow, a principle
that captures the common pattern they exhibit. Yet it is difficult to formulate such
a principle.32 I now consider three variants of Unity 1cr one might invoke to do
this job.
As a first pass, we might try:
Unity a For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified → x1, . . . , xn are c-
unified because x1, . . . , xn are r-unified
)
However, r-unification requires only that x1, . . . , xn stand in some relation or other
(as the realist would put it). But things that compose will typically stand in many
different relations, only some of which are relevant to whether (and what) they
compose. Unity a does not capture this and is therefore inadequate.
A natural response is to invoke ways of being related, as in:
Unity b For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified → for some way of
being related (x1, . . . , xn are c-unified because x1, . . . , xn are related in that
way)
)
What are these ways of being related? They seem very much like relations. Unity
b then collapses into the original, nominalistically unacceptable, Unity 1cr.
The solution is to employ a different kind of generalisation in the consequent
of Unity 1cr. That existential quantifier is first-order: it binds variables in name
position. But there are also higher-order quantifiers that bind variables of other
semantic types. In particular, second-order quantifiers bind variables in predicate
position. We can use second-order quantifiers to formulate the following variant
of Unity 1cr:33
Unity c For any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified → ∃Yn(x1, . . . , xn are
c-unified because Yn(x1, . . . , xn))
)
32. This is an instance of a familiar problem for nominalism. See Devitt (1980), Armstrong
(1980), and Lewis (1983: esp. 24–25) for more.
33. See van Cleve (1994) for a similar application of second-order quantification, reacting
to the Devitt-Armstrong exchange about “ostrich nominalism” cited in Footnote 32.
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This captures all the particular nominalist alternatives to the explanations deriving
from Unity 1cr. If second-order generalisation is compatible with nominalism,
then relationality can explain compositionality without things that are gluons.34
Is second-order quantification compatible with nominalism? It depends what
second-order quantifiers mean. I will not attempt to settle this here. I will instead
simply contrast two views and state my preference for the second.
According to the first view, second-order quantifiers range over a special kind
of thing, such as sets, extensions, intensions, or properties and relations. These
can be referred to with names of the metalanguage, and are in the domain of
its first-order quantifiers. This is the kind of semantics employed in standard
model-theoretic analyses of second-order quantification.35 If this captures what
second-order quantifiers mean, then Unity c is really just a notational variant of
Unity 1cr (at least, as viewed from our metalinguistic perspective when we invoke
these things to explain what second-order quantifiers mean).
According to the second view, second-order quantification is primitive: the
meaning of second-order quantifiers can only be captured by using second-order
quantifiers in the metalanguage (whose meaning can only be captured by using
second-order quantifiers in a meta-metalanguage, . . .). On this view, second-
order quantification is a sui generis form of non-objectual and non-substitutional
quantification. As a result, Unity c is not semantically equivalent to Unity 1cr
and is not committed to there being things that are relations. Its ontological
commitments are just those already implicit in each of its instantiations, that
is, the nominalistically acceptable explanations of compositional unity outlined
above.36
Primitivism about second-order quantification is controversial. Although
plausibly present in natural languages like English, the case is not watertight.37
So for argument’s sake, let us be concessive and grant primitivism’s opponents
that second-order quantification isn’t present in English. Then one cannot use
one’s prior understanding of second-order quantification in English to say what
the second-order formalism means. When one attempts to say in English what
34. Here are two nearby alternatives to Unity c. (1) Schematise the nominalist explanations
of c-unification and assert that some instance holds for each c-unified x1, . . . , xn. However,
this cannot accommodate c-unification explained by relations in principle inexpressible in
any possible language. The possibility of such relations is part and parcel of an adequately
full-blooded realism, according to which reality is entirely independent of, and hence not at
all constrained or restricted by, our linguistic abilities. (2) Employ quantification into sentence
position in place of second-order quantification, thus: for any x1, . . . , xn
(
x1, . . . , xn are c-unified
→ ∃p(x1, . . . , xn are c-unified because p)
)
. I focus on Unity c because it is more informative:
Unity c entails this proposal but not conversely.
35. See Shapiro (1991) for a thorough discussion.
36. Hale (2013: 180–189) develops this idea in response to Quine’s (1986: 68) famous
criticism of second-order logic as “set theory in sheep’s clothing”.
37. See Rayo and Yablo (2001) for the positive case and references.
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it means, one is forced to use a first-order gloss, which conflicts with the primi-
tivist interpretation. So in order to come to understand primitivist second-order
quantification, one must take a different approach. The most prominent option is
what Williamson (2003: 459) calls the direct method of immersion into a practice
of using a second-order language. Even if one doesn’t yet understand primitive
second-order quantification, I see no obstacle to coming to understand it in this
way.
Why take primitivism seriously? Why think that there really is a primitivist
interpretation out there for us to grasp? The answer has two parts. Firstly, because
there are, as far as I’m aware, no compelling arguments against primitivism.38
Moreover, many now accept a primitivist interpretation of at least one kind
of non-first-order quantification, namely plural quantification. Yet once the
intelligibility of one form of primitive non-first-order quantification is admitted,
a central obstacle to admitting more is removed. Secondly, primitive second-
order quantification has proven to be theoretically useful, with applications in
metaphysics, as well as the philosophy of logic, language, and mathematics.39
Although these applications do not establish that a primitivist interpretation is
available, they should suffice for regarding it as a live theoretical option. For
those unconvinced by primitivism, however, I’d like to emphasise that Section
2’s account of unity does not require it; only this section’s nominalist alternative
to Unity 1cr requires primitive second-order quantification. I assume a primitive
interpretation of all higher-order quantifiers henceforth.40
Primitivist interpretations of second-order quantification sever the connection
between quantification and thinghood driving the second horn of Priest’s dilemma.
The problem was that if gluons are not things, then no plurality is unified because
38. For discussion and references, see Prior (1971: Chapter 3), Boolos (1975), Hale (2013:
180–189), and Turner (2015).
39. For applications in logic, language, and mathematics, see, e.g., Prior (1971: Chapter 3),
Wright (1983), Boolos (1985), Williamson (2003), Wright (2007), Linnebo and Rayo (2012), Jones
(2016), and Bacon and Russell (2017). For applications within metaphysics, see, e.g., van Cleve
(1994), Dunaway (2013), Williamson (2013: 254–261), Dorr (2016), Jones (2017), and Goodman
(2017).
40. Primitive second-order quantification also enables a non-regressive explanation of rela-
tions holding amongst things. We can explain relations holding amongst things via particular
ways of them being related:
For any n-adic relation y, there is Yn such that, for any x1, . . . , xn(y r-unifies x1, . . . , xn → y
r-unifies x1, . . . , xn because Yn(x1, . . . , xn)).
For example, being between holds amongst Birmingham, Sheffield, and Oxford because Birm-
ingham is between Sheffield and Oxford. This approach uses primitive relationality to explain
relations holding amongst things. It avoids the Bradleyan regress arising from Unity 1rr because
Yn(x1, . . . , xn) involves x1, . . . , xn being related but not a thing that is a relation holding amongst
them.
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no thing unifies them. Yet according to primitivism, the truth of a second-order
existential generalisation does not require there to be a thing that witnesses the
generalisation. For ‘thing’ is a first-order notion, applicable to (all and only)
values of first-order variables and potential referents of names. This allows for
a plurality that is unified because there (second-order) is a unifier supplied by
Unity c, even though no (first-order) thing unifies them.41
We now have three accounts of unity, each with its own costs and benefits:
(A) Section 2’s account based around Unity 1cr, with its ontology of relations
and ‘holds amongst’ predicate.
(B) This section’s account based around Unity c, which dispenses with relations
in favour of primitive second-order quantification.
(C) Priest’s gluon theory, which requires true contradictions and failures of
modus ponens and the transitivity of identity.42
Those who value consistency, the transitivity of identity, and Leibniz’s Law
should go for (A) or (B). Nominalists about relations should go for (B) or (C).
And opponents of primitive higher-order quantification should go for (A) or
(C). My own view is that (B) is preferable, since I think I already understand
primitive higher-order quantification and so see no cost in appealing to it here.
Whether or not I am right to prefer (B), however, it is clear that neither horn of
Priest’s dilemma shows that unity is contradictory; at least, not without non-trivial
commitments elsewhere. For (A) shows that gluons can consistently unify, even
if they are things, while (B) shows that consistent unification does not require
things that are gluons.
4. Revenge?
Revenge problems arise when the theoretical resources used to resolve a problem
allow us to formulate a new instance of the problem that cannot be resolved by
applying those resources in the same way. The classic example is the liar paradox.
41. Priest also claims that unifiers must be things because we can speak and think about
them. A similar response is available. To speak of non-thing gluons is to use predicates R
appearing in true claims of the form: a1, . . . , an are c-unified because R(x1, . . . , xn). To think of
non-thing gluons is to think thoughts whose contents are expressible using such predicates.
Given a nominalistically acceptable conception of predication, this does not require things that
are gluons.
42. True contradictions because Priest-style gluons both are and are not things. Non-
transitive identity because Priest-style gluons unify pluralities by being identical to each of
their elements. Failures of modus ponens because transitivity is derivable from Leibniz’s Law
(a = b iff ∀X(Xa↔ Xb)), universal instantiation, and modus ponens, the first two of which hold
in Priest’s system.
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The liar sentence ‘this sentence is false’ is true iff it is false, yet truth and falsity
are exclusive and exhaustive. One standard response says that the original liar
sentence is neither true nor false, but has a special intermediate alethic status. We
can use this intermediate status to formulate a new strengthened liar sentence,
‘this sentence is false or intermediate’. This is just as paradoxical as the original
sentence: if it’s true then it’s false or intermediate, if it’s false then it’s true, and if
it’s intermediate then it’s true, yet truth, falsity, and intermediacy are supposed
to be exclusive and exhaustive.43
This section considers a revenge problem for Section 3’s proposal, and uses
it to argue that a version of the unity of propositions is (one of) reality’s most
fundamental forms of unity. To be clear, however, the problem is not specific
to this proposal. The problem arises for any view that permits higher-order
quantification. It specifically afflicts Section 3’s proposal only because Unity c
employs higher-order quantification. But neither Section 2’s proposal nor Priest’s
proposal is incompatible with higher-order quantification. So if higher-order
quantification is in fact legitimate, and if the revenge problem is sound, then all
three proposals fail; whereas, if higher-order quantification is illegitimate, then
Priest’s proposal and Section 2’s proposal are both available. I explain how the
problem arises for Priest’s proposal below, though I focus primarily on Unity c.
The goal is to explain how one emerges from many. According to Unity c,
each case of compositionality is explained by some case of relationality. This
proposal is adequate only if relationality is not a form of the emergence of one
from many. Otherwise, vicious regress arises; for each case of compositionality is
then explained by some case of compositionality, thereby leaving compositionality
itself unexplained. Unity c makes essential use of higher-order quantification. Yet
the apparatus of higher-order logic seems to provide a sense in which relationality
is a form of the emergence of one from many. I now explain why.
Given higher-order quantification into predicate position, it is natural to
permit quantification into other positions too. For present purposes, the key
examples are sentence position, and sentential operator position. One can use
these to characterise an identity relation on the type of sentences:44
∀p∀q(p = q↔ ∀φ(φ(p)↔ φ(q)))
We can use this sentential identity relation to express a sense in which that which
explains c-unification is a one arising from many.
Suppose that a, b are c-unified. Then by Unity c, for some Y2: a, b are c-unfied
because Y2(a, b). Let the dyadic relational predicate ‘R’ express this Y2. Then a, b
43. Another notable revenge problem concerns type-theoretic accounts of absolute gen-
erality. See Williamson (2003: esp. 458–459), Krämer (2017), and Florio and Jones (2018) for
discussion.
44. ‘p’ and ‘q’ are sentential variables. ‘φ’ is a one-place sentential operator variable.
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compose something because:
R(a, b)
Now, by the characterisation of sentential identity above, we have:
R(a, b) = R(a, b)
Given standard rules for the quantifiers, that entails:
∃p(R(a, b) = p)
This provides a higher-order sense in which that which explains c-unification
is a one: it is identical to something (though according to primitivism about
higher-order quantification, this use of ‘thing’ is a misleading artefact of the
English gloss). There is also a sense in which it combines many:
∃X2∃y∃z(R(a, b) = X2(y, z))
The elements of this many are drawn from different types, as is the one which
they form. But one arises from many nonetheless: predicational and objectual
aspects of reality combine into sentential, or propositional, aspects of reality.45 In
this sense, each case of relationality is also a case of cross-type compositionality.
The revenge problem can now be stated: according to Unity c, each case of
compositionality is explained by a case of cross-type compositionality; those
explanations therefore presuppose compositionality and so do not explain how it
is possible.
Call this kind of unity predicationality. Thinking in first-order terms, predica-
tionality is the unity of propositions. According to primitivism about higher-order
quantification, however, this gloss is misleading because it concerns things that
are propositions. Given primitivism, predicationality can be accurately described
and understood only by speaking and thinking in higher-order terms.
The account of compositionality in Section 3 employs predicationality. We
have just seen a sense in which predicationality is a form of compositionality.46
It appears to follow that Section 3’s account of compositionality uses a form of
45. For more on this type-theoretic conception of reality itself, as opposed to merely the
language used to describe it, see Williamson (2013: 260–261), and Florio and Linnebo (2016:
Section 7), Jones (2016), Jones (2017), and Florio and Jones (2018).
46. In the interests of simplicity, I gloss over the following subtlety in the text. Predication-
ality does not directly explain compositionality. Predicational unification of R, a, b requires only
that some p predicationally unifies them, not that it be the case that p. To see why, note that
this p’s existence—i.e., ∃p(p = R(a, b))—follows from R(a, b) = R(a, b). Yet that follows from
the characterisation of sentential identity alone and does not entail that R(a, b). According to
Unity c, a, b are c-unified because R(a, b). So that which explains c-unification is not merely
predicational unification of R, a, b; it’s the strictly stronger claim that R(a, b). In first-order
terms, predicationality is the kind of unity exhibited by propositions, not the kind of unity that
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compositionality to explain compositionality, and hence does not explain how
compositionality is possible. How problematic is this? I now provide three
reasons not to regard it as problematic.
Firstly, and least concessively, one can deny that predicationality is a form of
compositionality; the appearance otherwise is an illusion generated by ignoring
the type distinctions at the heart of higher-order logic. For example, standard
systems of higher-order logic do not permit argument positions that accept
expressions of more than one type. So the ordinary identity predicate and identity
relation are distinct from the sentential and predicational notions characterised
above. And the ordinary composition predicate and composition relation are
distinct from the predicational notions currently at issue. On this view, it is really
just equivocation to use the same notation for each, or to regard them as instances
of a single phenomenon.
Although I am sympathetic to this first response, it requires controversial
assumptions about the structure of higher-order logic. Systems of cumulative
type theory have been developed that relax these assumptions.47 This makes
conceptual space for a sense in which compositionality and predicationality are
instances of a single phenomenon. My second and third responses to the revenge
problem are more concessive, and require no such controversial assumptions.
Secondly, predicationality is an intrinsically cross-type form of unity. It com-
bines the incommensurably different aspects of reality expressed by, for example,
singular terms and predicates into those expressed by sentences. The kind of com-
positionality with which we began, however, is an intra-type notion: it combines
pluralities of things into further things, remaining within the first-order domain.
The instantiations of Unity c explain intra-type compositionality using inter-type
predicationality. So even if predicationality is a form of compositionality, my
proposal explains one kind of instance in terms of another very different kind.
On this view, inter-type predicationality is the fundamental form of composi-
tionality and explains all others. In particular, the familiar cases of intra-type
compositionality with which we began are explained in inter-type terms.
Thirdly, one cannot avoid taking predicationality as primitive. Every theory,
and every explanation, employs whole sentences composed out of other elements.
But predicationality is the kind of unity that combines those elements’ worldly
correlates into propositional wholes. So every theory and every explanation
presupposes predicationality. As Lewis put it:
accounts for their truth or the existence of facts. An instance of the latter kind of unity, not
predicationality, is what directly explains c-unification. The revenge problem is that the p—i.e.,
R(a, b)—whose being such that p explains c-unification of a, b is itself a predicational unity: a, b
are c-unified because a certain predicational unity is a p such that p, namely R(a, b). That’s the
sense in which Unity c presupposes predicationality.
47. For recent discussion, see Degen and Johanssen (2000), Linnebo and Rayo (2012),
Krämer (2017), and Florio and Jones (2018).
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Doing away with all unanalysed predication is an unattainable aim, and
so an unreasonable aim. No theory is to be faulted for failing to achieve
it. For how could there be a theory that names entities, or quantifies over
them, in the course of its sentences, and yet altogether avoids primitive
predication? Artificial tricks aside, the thing cannot be done. (Lewis 1983:
22)
Lewis’s notion of predication here is not quite our own. His concern is with true
predication because he’s responding to Armstrong’s (1978; 1980) “one over many”
argument for realism about universals, and Armstrong’s universals are intended
to explain true predication. Our concern, however, is with the meaningfulness
of predication.48 But the point is essentially the same. Every theory presupposes,
hence does not explain, predicationality.
Here’s how Priest’s proposal employs predicationality. He proposes explain-
ing unity via identity between each of the many parts and a single gluon. So
where g is the gluon of a, b, they are unified because:
a = g ∧ b = g
That is a unity because it is identical to something:
∃p(p = (a = g ∧ b = g))
And it also combines many:49
∃φ2∃X2∃x∃y∃z((a = g ∧ b = g) = φ2(X2(x, z),X2(y, z)))
So even Priest uses predicationally unified wholes to explain compositionality.
It is in principle impossible to explain predicationality in other terms. In
this sense, predicationality is one of reality’s two most fundamental forms of
unity. The other is the higher-order analogue of the unity of facts, that is, the
unity characteristic of being a p such that p.50 Call this notion being the case.
Predicational unity combines R, a, b into a propositional whole R(a, b). But it
doesn’t unify them sufficiently to determine whether or not R(a, b). The additional
unification supplied by being the case is required for that. Like predicational
unity, it is in principle impossible to explain being the case in other terms,
48. This is a misleading way to put it because our concern is not with language, but with
what language says. Predicationality, and the more familiar topic of the unity of propositions,
is the metaphysical analogue of the linguistic notion of meaningful predication.
49. φ2 is a variable in the position of a 2-place sentential operator: it combines with
two sentences to form a sentence. Instantiating ‘φ2’ with ‘∧’, ‘X2’ with the ordinary identity
predicate, ‘x’ with ‘a’, ‘y’ with ‘b’, and ‘z’ with ‘g’yields the triviality: (a = g ∧ b = g) = (a =
g ∧ b = g).
50. In lambda notation, (λp.p).
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because it is employed by every explanation and theory whatsoever. These are
reality’s two most fundamental forms of unity, mutually supporting components
of metaphysical bedrock.
In conclusion, the revenge problem fails because the predicational unity
presupposed by Unity c (as well as by both Unity 1cr and Priest’s gluon-theory)
is absolutely fundamental and presupposed by any explanation of anything
whatsoever. That is compatible with using predicationality to explain other kinds
of unity, including the (intra-type) compositionality with which we began. Section
2 showed how to do so, given realism about relations. And Section 3 showed
how to do so without things that are relations. Either way, there is no obstacle to
providing a consistent account of compositionality in other terms.
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